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11.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal the district court's dismissal of Appellant Fields' petition for
postconviction relief, in which he sought the benefit of a newly acknowledged rule guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment: if a convicted defendant may be sentenced to death only after one or more
additional facts are found to exist, he is entitled to have a jury determine the existence of those
additional facts. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). Fields seeks a determination by this
Court that as a matter of state law, Ring should have been retroactively applied to his case and
the district court should have been granted his petition and a new sentencing proceeding.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS & STATEMENT OF FACTS

At the time of Petitioner's trial, eligibility for death turned on the trial court making a
statutorily required fact-finding. Specifically, a defendant was eligible for death only if the trial
court found a statutory aggravating circumstance to exist.' In Petitioner's trial, the court
complied with this. The jury was released upon returning its verdict, after which the trial court
found a statutory aggravating circumstance to exist and made additional fact-findings before
sentencing the Petitioner to death. On direct appeal, this Court rejected the argument that Fields'
sentencing proceeding was constitutionally infirm for lack of jury determination of an
aggravating circumstance, specific intent to kill during the commission of a felony. State v.
Fields, Nos. 19185 & 19809, Brief of Appellant at 57-58 (Idaho Supreme Court, filed Jan. 27,

'Also in lceeping with the statutory scheme then in effect, the trial court was required to
select the sentence. Whether it elected to sentence the defendant to death or a lesser penalty
turned on certain additional fact-findings which the trial court was statutorily required to make.
r.c.419-2515.

1994). See State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904,916, 908 P.2d 1211, 1223 (1995). At a subsequent
post-conviction in 1995, Fields again raised the issue of his denial of a jwy determination of facts
necessary for aggravating circumstances, which was denied by the district court and affirmed on
appeal. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000).
The statutory sentencing scheme under which Petitioner was tried was enacted in its
original form in 1977. Idaho Code Section 19-2515 (1977). While various amendments were
made to the scheme over time, Fields was tried in all respects relevant to this appeal under the
original capital statutory scheme as enacted in 1977.
Within forty-two days of the Ring decision, Fields sought redress by filing in the district
court (I) a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and (2) a
postconvictioil proceeding under Idaho Code Section 19-2719, alternatively denominated a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Idaho Constitution. CR at 5-36. Fields explicitly
raised the claim that the state courts were not bound to a federal retroactivity standard and urged
that he be granted relief under state retroactivity law. CR 65-72, 174-76. The district court
denied the Rule 35 motion and rejected the postcoilviction claims. CR at 293-304. Fields
timely appealed. CR at 307. By the time Ring was decided in 2002, the original conviction,
sentence and judgment against Fields was final.

As Fields was seeking relief in Idaho state courts, the United States Supreme Court
decided that, as a matter of federal law, Ring was not retroactively applicable to individuals
whose cases were final when Ring was decided. Schviro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004).

Ln this Court's lead case on the matter, Porter 1 . State, 140 Idaho 780, 102 P. 3d 1099
(2004), the Court declined to retroactively apply Ring "under a more lenient [state] standard of

retroactivity," finding that the issue raised by Porter was "based solely upon the Federal
Constitution" making "the question of retroactivity of that decision [I a matter for federal law,
not state law." Porter at 783, 1102. See also, State v. H o f f a n , 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958
(200.5), and State v. Leavitt, 141 Idaho 895, 120 P. 3d 283 (2005).
Last year, the United States Supreme Court held that federal retroactivity doctrine,
initially set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), "limits the kinds of
constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in
any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own stale criminal convictions, to
provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed 'nonretroactive' under Teague. " Danforth v.
Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1042 (2008).2 The district court mentioned the Danforth decision
in its opinion dismissing Fields' petition, acknowledging that States are "free to evaluate whether
the new rule should be applied retroactively," CR at 297, but it did not further analyze the case
under the retroactivity doctrines that it identified under state law. See CR at 299 (identifying
three part test, BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004)); CR
at 297 (identifying "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty test" o f I n re Goford, 127 Idaho,
472, 903 P.2d 61 (199.5). Instead the district court cited what it considered to be the binding
precedent of Porter and Hoffman as the basis for rejecting Fields' claims. CR at 299-300.

'Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court remanded five other Idaho capital
cases for reconsideration in light of its opinion in Danforth v. Minnesota. Rhoades v. Idaho, 128
S.Ct. 1441 (2008) (mem.); McKinney v. Idaho, 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008) (mem.); Pizzuto v. Idaho,
128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008) (mern.); Card v. Idaho, 128 S.Ct 1442 (2008) (mem.); Hairston v. Idaho,
128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008) (mem.).

111.

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether in light of Idaho's long history of jury participation in sentencing in capital

cases, the fundamental role which the right to jury fact-finding plays in our conception of justice,
and the Court's consistent use of Idaho's established test for determining which new court
decisions should be given retroactive effect, Ring should be applied retroactively to provide
Petitioner a remedy for the indisputable denial of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury
trial on whether the facts necessary to make him eligible for a death sentence existed.
IV.

ARGUMENT
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Fields is not before the Court seeking wiildfall relief on an issue he is litigating for the
first time in light of an unanticipated favorable ruling. He previously lost the issue in one form
or another on direct appeal and a successive post-conviction proceeding before this Court. This
Court consistently has rejected the argument whenever (and by whomever) it was raised. After
Furman struck down death penalty statutes across the nation in 1972, general uncertainty reigned
for many years in the death penalty arena. In the midst of the confusion, Idaho courts repeatedly
overruled capital defendants objections to jury-free penalty phase proceedings. Many courts read
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), to hold that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury
participation in sentencing proceedings.
However, acknowledging it had erred in Walton, the United States Supreme Court held in
2002 that where a convicted defendant may be sentenced to death only after one or more
additional facts are found to exist, he is entitled to have a jury determine the existence of those
additional facts. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). The statutory scheme under which

Fields was sentenced required that the State could sentence him to death only after one or more
additional facts were found to exist, and the trial court conducted the required fact-finding. It is,
therefore, beyond dispute that Fields' death sentence cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Funda~lientalfainless requires that this urtconstitutional sentence be remedied. Withholding a
remedy because the United States Supreme Court took until 2002 to acknowledge Fields'
position was correct all along cannot be squared with any basic conception of justice. This Court
has the authority to correct this basic injustice. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1041-42
(2008) (federal non-retroactivity doctrine, intended to limit federal court authority to overturn
state convictions, does not limit state court authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of
constitutional law).
In addition to basic fairness requiring remedial measures, longstanding and consistently
applied Idaho precedent requires the retroactive application of Ring. In particular, this Court
determines whether a new rule annou~~ced
in a court decision will be retroactively applied by
balancing the first against the remaining two of three factors, i.e.- it balances (1) the purpose of
the new rule against (2) the reliance on the prior decisions of this Court and (3) the effect of the
new rule on the administration ofjustice. There is no cause for departure from this test. In this
case, stare decisis controls that application of the state rule of retroactivity.
Applied here, this test overwhelmingly favors the full retroactive application of Xing.
The purpose of Ring is to ensure that juries determine the existence (or non-existence) of any fact
necessary to increase the upper range of a convicted first degree murder defendant's possible
sentence from life to death in order to enforce the Sixth Amendment's dual purpose of ensuring
jury trials to individual defendants and participation in serious criminal trials by the community,

thereby ensuring that com~nunityvalues are reflected in the sentence imposed. As for reliance,
the State has no legitimate interest in relying on unconstitutional laws or in death sentences
obtained unconstitutionally, so can have no such interest in standing by sentences already
achieved tlxough such laws. Applying Ring retroactively will have a substantial positive but, at
most, only a minimal negative impact on the administration ofjustice. Consequently, under
Idaho's retroactivity test, Ring should be applied to Mr. Fields
B.

RING'S HISTORICAL CONTEXT INFORMS ANY RETROACTIVITY
ANALYSIS.

Idaho's 1977 capital statutory scheme, in all relevant respects identical to the statutory
scheme under which Petitioner was tried, was one of a series of necessary state court responses to
changing federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the 1970s. Modem capital jurisprudence
was born with the United States Supreme Court striking down capital statutofy schemes
throughout the Nation in 1972. Furrnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman held that
states must provide capital sentencers guidance on how to determine whether to impose the death
penalty. "[U]nquestionably [Idaho's] pre-1973 statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution under . . . Furman[.]" State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho
766,768, 589 P.2d 101, 103 (1979). Responding to Furman, in 1973 Idaho revised its death
penalty scheme making death sentences mandatory for "[elvery person guilty of murder in the
first degree[.]" Idaho Code $18-4004 (am. 1973). Three years later, the United States Supreme
Court struck down a mandatory death penalty statute virtually identical to Idaho's revised statute.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In an effort to align its death penalty scheme
with Woodson, in 1977 Idaho removed from the jury its traditional role as adjudicator of who,

among capital defendants, would live and who would die. Specifically, and relevant to the
question now before the Court, was the Idaho modified scheme provision that before a defendant
could face a range of penalties which included death, a court had to find that at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance existed. I.C. 19-2515 (1 977).
Despite Idaho's long history of, and its constitutional reverence for, the right to a jury
trial, when confronted with the question of whether the United States or Idaho Constitutions
guaranteed the right to jury participation in the capital sentencing process, a narrow majority of
this Court "held that there is no federal constitutional requirement ofjury participation in the
sentencing process and that the decision to have jury participation in the sentencing process, as
contrasted with judicial discretion sentencing, is within the policy determination of the individual
states." State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 15,966 P.2d 1, 15 (1998) (quoting Creech v. Arave, 105
Idaho 362,373,670 P.2d 463,474 (1983)). This Court later held that "Art. 1, $7 of the Idaho
Constitution does not require participation of a july in the sentencing process in a capital case."

State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 904, 674 P.2d 396, 400 (1983). In State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho
129,774 P.2d 299, reh 'g denied (1989), a 3 to 2 majority of this Court specifically rejected, as a
matter of federal law, that which the United States Supreme Court ultirnately acknowledged in

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002), "that a capital sentencing statute that requires the
judge to detennine aggravating circumstances takes this factual element out of the jury's hands in
violation of the sixth amendment." Charboneau at 148, 3 17.
In light of the uncertainty in death penalty law created by United States Supreme Court
capital decisions in the post-Furman 1970s, particularly regarding issues concerning penalty
phase juries, neither Idaho's statutory sentencing scheme's reserving the sentencing

respo~lsibilitiesexclusively to the court nor this Court's continued rejection of attacks on it is
surprising. Indeed, in 1990, the United States Supreme Courl signaled state courts that excluding
juries from capital sentencing proceedings was constitutionally acceptable. Walton v. Auizona,
497 U.S. 639 (1990) (no constitutional requirement that a jury must determine whether
aggravating factors exist).
Ten year later, the United States Supreme Court overruled Walton, holding that "capital
defei~dai~ts,
no less than noncapital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Ring at 589. 111
overmli~lgWalton, the Ring holding made plain that Idaho's statutory scheme violated the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury. See State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729, 730, 52 P.3d 874, 875
(2002) (Ring "appears to invalidate the death penalty scheme in Idaho which to this time has
allowed the sentencing judge to make factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to the
imposition of a death sentence").
C.

IDA130 SHOULD REMEDY THE VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL BY APPLYING RING
TO A BROADER RANGE OF CASES THAN UNDER THE
RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE.

In Danforth, the United States Supreme Court clarified that "the source of a 'new rule' is
the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the
underlying right necessarily pre-exists [the United States Supreme Court's] articulation of the
new rule." Id. at 1035. In Ring, the Court did not "create" the right to jury fact-finding of a
statutory aggravating factor. Rather, it belatedly determined that that right is inherent in the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Indeed, in overruling Walton v. Arizona,

497 U.S. 639 (1990), the Ring Court acknowledged that it had come down on the wrong side of
the issue over ten years earlier. Danforth also clarified that the federal retroactivity doctrine
elluuciated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), and upon which it relied
in Schriro v. Sumnzeulin, 542 U.S 348, 352 (2004), to reject the retroactive application of Ring, is
a federal rule limited in its restrictive application to federal habeas proceedings. Danforth, 128
S.Ct. at 1038. Thus, the only question Fields presents to this Court is whether Idaho's
retroactivity doctrine compels the application of Ring's achiowledgment of the right to jury factfinding in a capital case to persons whose convictions and seilteilces were final on June 24,2002,
the date the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring.

In the postconviction proceeding below, the district court rejected Fields' efforts to
existed, without
enforce his right to have a jury determine whether an aggravating circumsta~~ce
which death would not be within the range of sentences available to the state to impose. The
district court denied relief based on this Court's decisions. In the leading case on the issue, this
Court unequivocally held:
Porter asks that we apply a more lenient standard of retroactivity than that applied
by the United States Supreme Court. In a capital case, jury participation in the
sentencing process is not required under the Idaho Constitution. State v. Hoffman,
123 Idaho 638,643,851 P.2d 934,939 (1993); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,
770, 810 P.2d 680,708 (1991). The issue raised by Porter in this application for
post-coiiviction relief is based solely upon the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the
retroactivity of that decision is a matter offederal law, not state law. The United
States Supreme Court has resolved that issue in Summerlin.
Porter v. State, 140 Idaho at 783, 102 P. 3d at 1102 (emphasis added). In McKinney v. State, the

Court reaffirmed its Porter holding:
In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), the
United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee

requires that a jury, not a judge, find an aggravating circumstance necessary for
the imposition of the death penalty. III Schriro v, Sumnzerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358,
124 S.Ct. 2519,2526, 159 L.Ed.2d 442,453 (2004), the Supreme Court held, "
Ring annouilced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases
already final on direct review." McKinney aslts us to hold that Ring is retroactive,
thereby overn~lingSummerlin. The retroactivity of Ring was a matter of federal
constitutional law, not state law. We have no authority to overrule decisions of the
United States Supreme Court on issues offederal constitutional law.

McKinney v. State, 143 Idaho 590, 595, 150 P.2d 283 (2006) (emphasis added),
The United States Supreme Court specifically acknowledged the state's right to provide a
remedy to a constitutional right even where the federal courts declined.
It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of nonretroactivity was fashioned
to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state
criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to
overturn state convictions-not to limit a state court's authority to grant relief for
violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State's
convictions.

Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. at 1041. This Court must acknowledge that Fields was
sentenced in violation of his constitutional right to trial by jury and that his sentence is, therefore,
constitutionally infirm. This Court ought to apply Ring retroactively and grant him a new
sentencing proceeding.
D.

APPLYING THIS COURT'S LONG ESTABLISHED AND
CONSISTENTLY EMPLOYED PRECEDENT REQUIRING
THE USE OF A THREE-FACTOR TEST TO SETTLE
QUESTIONS OF RETROACTIVITY MANDATES THAT
RING BE GIVEN FULL RETROACTIVE EFFECT.

This Court first applied the current state test in a criminal case in 1975. State v. Whitman,
96 Idaho 489, 531 P.2d 579 (1975). When applied here, the three factor test requires that Ring be
given full retroactive effect.

As recently as 2006, this Court has held that where controlling precedent on questions of
Idaho law exists, stare decisis requires that the precedent be followed "'unless it has proven over
time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice."' Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co., 142 Idaho 589,592,130 P.3d 1127,1130 (2006) (quoting Houghland Farms, inc.
v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,77, 803 P.2d 978,983 (1990). There is no reasoil to depart from this
Court's longstanding and consistently applied retroactivity precedent.
1.

State v. WIzitman Established the State Retroactivity Test Applicable
ill this Case.

This Court first addressed the question of retroactivity in a civil case, finding that a
statute relating to "a host's liability in a negligently caused accident" was unconstitutional.
Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,24,523 P.2d 1365, 1370 (1974). In Thompson, this Court
identified three approaches to retroactivity: the "traditional rule" under which new decisions are
applied to "both past and future cases"; the "prospective rule" under which new decisions are
"effective only in ft~tureactions"; and the "modified prospective rule" under which the new
decisions apply prospectively "and to the parties bringing the action resulting in the new
decision[] or, to the parties bringing the action and all similar pending actions." Id. at 25, 523
P.2d at 1371. To determine which approach to apply in a given case, this Court adopted the
United States Supreme Court's rationale in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Thompson, supra. The following year, this Court applied the Linkletter factors in a criminal
context, firmly establishing the approach to be talcen in determining whether or not a decision is
to be retroactively applied. Under State v. Whitman, supra, "The Court must weigh: (1) The

purpose of the new rule; (2) Reliance on the prior decisions of this Court; and (3) The effect of
the new rule on the administration ofjustice." Id at 491, 531 P.2d at 581 (footnote omitted)
Later the Court explained that the first factor to be balanced against the other two to determine
whether to limit the retroactive applicatioi~of the decision. Jones v. FVutson, 98 Idaho 606, 609,
570 P.2d 284,287 (1977). As recently as 2004, the Court has employed this three factor test to
determine whether a new court decision should be given retroactive effect. BHA Investments, Inc.
v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 173, 108 P.3d 315,320 (2004).
Until Danforth, the sole exception to this Court's use of the three factor test to determine
a new decision's retroactive effect was where a rule required by the federal constitution
announced in a United States Supreme Court decision was at issue. When such rules have been
at issue, the Court consistently restricted its analysis to the application of federal retroactivity
doctrine. The Court's decisioils regarding the retroactive application of Ring in the individual
death row inmates' cases currently or previously before this Court reflect that fact. So, too, does
the Court's identical analysis in all the remaining cases in which the Courl ruled on the
retroactive applicatioil of Ring. Danforth changed all that.
2.

Applied Here, Idaho's Retroactivity Test Shows That Ring must Be
Given FuII Retroactive Effect.
a.

Ring's purpose is to preserve both the defendant's and the
community's right to a jury.

The aim of the "purpose of the decision" factor is to assess the extent to which the
decision's purpose "would be served by applying the case to both past and future actions."
Thompson, 96 Idaho at 25, 523 P.2d at 1371. Put alternatively, the ail11 is to assess the extent to

which the failure to apply a decision retroactively "would ...thwart[]" its purpose. Gay v. County

Commissioners ofBonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,631,651 P.2d 560,565 (1982).
The narrow holding of Ring is that, as a matter of Sixth Amendment law, "[clapital
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Ring at 588 &
589. The right to a jury trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145

The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee has a dual purpose of ensuring jury trials to
individual defenda~~ts
and participation in serious trials by the community, thereby ensuring that
cominunity values are reflected in the sentence imposed
Thus, one purpose of Ring is to ensme that each potentially death sentenced defendant is
accorded his or her constitutionally guaranteed right to have a jury determine the existence (or
non-existence) of any fact necessary to increase his maximum imposable sentence to death from
a non-death sentence that would be imposable based on his conviction alone. This straightforward purpose would obviously be served by giving Ring full retroactive effect.
[AJn accused's right to trial by a jury of his fellow citizens when charged with a
serious criminal offense is unquestionably one of his most valuable and wellestablished safeguards in this country. . . . [Jlurors come from all classes of
society, they are better calculated to judge of motives, weigh probabilities, and
take what may be called a common sense view of a set of circumstances. . . than
any single man, however pure, wise, and eminent he may be. Trial by an
impartial jury . . . raises another imposing barrier to oppression by government
offices. . . . The institution of the jury. . . places the real direction of society in the
hands of the governed . . . and not in that of the government.

Green v. U S . , 356 U.S. 165,215-16 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and
Douglas, J.) (citations, intenlal quotatioil marks, and footnotes omitted). See also, Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (framers intended jury to exercise ultimate control in the
judiciary; u111ess the judge's authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury's verdict, the jury
cannot exercise the intended control); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 (1957) ("Trial by jury in a
court of law . . . has served and remains one of our most vital barriers to governmental
arbitrariness. These elemental procedural safeguards were embedded in our Constitution to
secure their inviolateness and sanctity against the passing demands of expediency or
convenience.").
The failure to apply Ring with full retroactivity would thwart its purpose; for having
denied Mr. Fields the benefit of Ring, the State will execute him pursuant to a death sentence
which it inlposed based on facts detennined not by a jury but a judge. Mr. Fields and the small
number of others denied the benefit ofRing will be executed pursuant to a sentence which cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The other purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and, thus, the other purpose
of Ring is to ensure community participation in serious criminal trials, thereby ensuring that
community values are reflected in the se~~tence
imposed. This additional aim, imported from
common law, was to invest the general population with the means to check overreaching and
othenvise corrupt prosecutorial and judicial decision-making.3
3Colonistshad themselves experienced such oveneaching. "In the 1730s, two successive
New York grand juries had refused to indict the popular publisher John Peter Zenger-and when
the government instead proceeded by information, the petit jury famously acquitted. (One of the
articles for which Zenger was prosecuted had featured ail attack on New Yorlc Governor Cosby
for having engaged ill personal litigation tactics that sought to evade the right to jury trial in civil

Because the purpose of the jury is to guard against arbitrary abuses ofpower by
interposing the commonsense judgment of the community between the State and
the defendant, the jury venire cannot be composed only of special segments of the
population. "Connnunity participation in the administration of the criminal law ...
is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system." Taylor [v. Louisiana,]
419 U.S. [522,] 530[.]

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 314. Guaranteed in Arlicle 3, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution as well as in its Fifth (grand jury), Sixth (criminal petit), and Seventh (civil)
Amendments, juries are literally a constitutive elelllent of our Nation's democracy. U.S. Const,

art. Ill, 52, amends. V, VI, & VII.
The purpose of tbe jury as a place lor the citizenry's civic involvement did not end with
the ratification of the Bill of Rights. On the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has
comparatively recently sounded that theme in its fair jury selection decisions. In Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that, "The harm from
discriininatoryjury selection extends beyond . . . the defendant and the excluded juror to touch
the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries
undermine public confideilce in the fairness of our system of justice." Id. at 87. A few years
later, the United States Supreme Court held tbat defendants have standing to object to the
prosecution's illegally striking members of a cognizable group even where the defendants
themselves do not belong to that group. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). The court
reasoned that in such situations standing exists to, ainong other things, preserve the jury systein
as a constitutive element of American democracy, along the way highlighting three
characteristics of the jury systein which make it so. First, because ordinary citizens serve as
cases.)" Althil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights 84-5 (1998)
15

"'jurors actual or possible"' the people can prevent the jury system's "'arbitrary use or abuse."'

Id. at 406 (quoting Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,310 (1992)). Second, the jury system
"guards the rights of the parties." Id. at 41 I . Third, it "preserves the democratic eleme~ltof the
law as it guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of
the people . . . . The verdict will not be accepted or u~lderstoodin these terms if the jury is chosen
by unlawhl means at the outset." Powers at 413.
b.

Juries reflect commuliity norms essential in death cases.

Additionally, under the Eighth Amendment, sentencing is supposed to reflect community
values and "a community-basedjudgment that the sentence constitutes proper retribution."
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See Ring, 536 US., at 613-

19 (Breyer, J., concunit~g).
Juries-comprised as they are of a fair cross section of the community-are more
representative institutions than is the judiciary; they reflect more accurately the
composition and experiences of the community as a whole, and inevitably make
decisions based on community values more reliably, than can that segment of the
community that is selected for service on the bench.
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,486-487 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). See also, Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-526
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ( ("The 'higher authority' to whom present-day capital judges
may be 'too responsive' is a political climate in which judges who covet higher office - or who
merely wish to remain judges -must constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty
The danger that they will bend to political pressures whe11 pronouncing sentence in highly
publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted by judges beholden to King George
III.")(omitting footnote with citations to newspaper articles as support for the proposition that the

political climate requires viable judicial and legislative candidates to strongly and clearly support
the death penalty); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (A jury more likely than a
judge will "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death." ).
The purpose of Ring v. Arizona in its preservation of the right to a jury trial weighs
heavily in favor of application to Mr. Fields' sentence of death.

3.

The State's Reliance on Pre-Ring Law Should Carry
Little Weight, If Any.

The second factor the Court considers is the "reliance factor," the extent to which
litigants and courts generaily have relied on the earlier rule. The more litigants and courts used
the earlier rule, the greater the reliance. This is especially true in civil cases, where individuals
and businesses make life and fina~~cial
decisions based on the law as it is at the time the decision
must be made
a.

Reliance is more compelling in civil cases.

In Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,523 P.2d 1365 (1974), for example, the decision
whose retroactivity was at issue invalidated a statute's precluding negligence lawsuits by
automobile guests against their hosts. The Court found the reliance factor there very strong
because "[tlhe possibility exists that hosts may have offered rides to guests relying on the
protection ofthe guest statute from neghgence actions. Additionally, insurance companies may
have relied upon the guest statute in setting their rates." Thompson, 96 Idaho at 25, 523 P. 2d at
1371. Thus, the greater the number of hosts and insurance companies which relied in their
decision making on the guest statute, the stronger the reliance factor. In BHA Investments, the
new rule whose retroactivity was at issue prohibited cities from imposing liquor license transfer

fees. The Court analyzed the reliance factor by looking to the number of times the City of Boise
had relied on its ordinance allowing liquor license transfer fees. Id. at 320, 108 P.3d at 173.
Similarly, in Balcer v. Shavers, 117 Idaho 696,697,791 P.2d 1275, 1276 (1990), the decision at
issue "abolished the open and obvious danger doctrine" whereby owners had no duty to lceep
their premises safe from dangerous conditions which were lcnown or should have been lcnown by
them. Id. In analyzing the reliance factor, the Court loolted to whether "landowners may have
allowed dangerous conditions to remain on their property because they believed they had
protection under our prior decisions" and whether such reliance could have existed in light of a
relevant statute. Id.
In each of these cases, the litigants' interests served by reliance were plainly adversarial.
Most civil cases are zero sum games, i.e.- when one litigant wins, the other loses. Criminal cases
stand in stark contrast: the State wins when justice is done. B e r g e ~v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935).4 Standing by a sentence which cannot. withstand constitutional scrutiny is not doing
justice. The underlying purpose of Idaho Code Section 19-2719's limitations on postconviction
proceedings in capital cases is to "expedit[e] constitutionally imposed sentences." State v. Beam,
115 Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988) (emphasis added). There is no interest in
executing zinconstitutionally imposed sentences, thus diminishing any real weight properly given
to the reliance factor.

""The [prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as colnpelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

b.

Reliance, in spite of foreseeability of change, deserves less
weight.

If the prosecuting attorneys and courts relied on the statutory rule without considering
how that rule would fare under federal col~stitutionalanalysis, their reliance was misplaced. For
they knew or should have known that the legislature's enactment was not made in reliance on
.~
what evidence there was at that time
guidance from the United States Supreme C o ~ r t Indeed,
strongly disfavored removing juries altogether from sentencing proceedings. Whether the
"Constitution requires that the death sentence be imposed by a jury" was raised but not addressed
in Loclett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 609 11.16 (1978). After Furman, the overwhelming majority of
states with the death penalty had kept juries. Indeed, in upholding the Florida capital statutory
scheme against the general and broad attack that it violated Furman, the United States Supreme
Court noted that, under Florida's scheme, "the sentence is determined by the trial judge rather
than the jury" but nowhere suggested that states could dispense with penalty phase jury factfinding. Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Until Walton, this Court's later consistent
rejections of challenges to Idaho's dispensing with the jury altogether for penalty phase purposes
were not made in reliance on any clear law either.

However, removing juries from their traditional role resulted from a misunderstanding
of United States Supreme Court caselaw. See State v. Creech,105 Idaho 362,377, 670 P. 2d 463,
478 (1 983) (Huntley, J., dissenting) (legislative statement of purpose regarding 1977 statute
wrongly "suggests that the Supreme Court decisions mandated the removal of the jury from its
traditional powers and fu~~ctions");
State v. Sival, 105 Idaho 900, 910,674 P.2d 396, 406 (1983),
Bistline, J. dissenting. ("Following Woodson the legislature set guidelines to follow, and,
unfortunately believing (as the Statement of Purpose to the proposed 1977 amendment shows, set
out in the Creech dissenting opinion of Justice Huntley) that the Supreme Court of the United
States had barred juries from continuing as sentencing authorities, made those guidelines for the
benefit of judges.")

It cannot be said that the cl~angeRing has brought was unforeseeable. See e.g., State v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 155,774 P.2d at 325 (Huntley, J. and Bistline, J: dissenting) ("The
plain fact is, before a persoil is eligible to be executed, afinding must be made that the
aggravating circumstance existed. That finding is typically a jury finding, it was a jury function in
Idaho from territorial days through 1977, and is a fact to be found by the jury in all but four of the
states which have the death penalty."). See also, Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F. 2d 1011 (9" Cir.
1988) ("We therefore hold that Arizona's aggravating circumstances function as elements of the
crime of capital murder requiring a jury's determination."). If the reliance by the courts was
legitimate, it was not without compellil~gwarning signals. The question or foreseeability
diminishes the weight to be given to the reliance factor. See State v. Machen, 100 Idaho 167,
170, 595 P.2d 316,319 (1979) (where change in law unforeseeable, reliance on earlier law was in
"good faith").
c.

There are few remaining cases in which reliance on the preRing rule played any role.

A fully retroactive applicatioll of Ring would affect only a small number of cases. See

infra at n.6 and accompanying text. Thus, the weight accorded the reliance factor should
likewise be small. A decision from this Court extending the retroactive effect of Ring to cases
already final will be "of limited applicability and will affect only those criminal defendants
currently [sentenced] in Idaho under the prior statutory scheme." Gafford v. State, 127 Idaho
472,475, 903 P.2d 61, 64, reh gdenied (1995).
Of course, even had the reliance been greater, the weight given that factor would not

outweigh the right to a constitutionally imposed death sentence

4.

Application of Ring to Petitioners Will Have a Substantial Positive but
Minimal Negative, If Any, Impact on the Administration of Justice.

"This factor talces into account the number of cases that would be reopened if the decision
[at issue] is applied retroactively." Thonzpsoiz v. Ifagan, 96 Idaho at 25, 523 P.2d at 1371 (1974).

See, Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,609,570 P.2d 284,287 (Idaho 1977) (where the decision at
issue struck a statute of liinitations tolling rule, the Court noted that it was "convinced that [a]
minimal number of cases will proceed to trial solely because of a prospective application of the
[decision], and thus the impact on the administration of justice will be slight."). Unlike

Thompson where the Court was left to speculate on how many hosts and insurance companies
had relied on the guest statute and in Balcer where it was left to speculate whether landowners
had allowed dangerous conditions to go unrepaired in reliance on the earlier rule, here the
number of cases affected by the reliance is ltnown: eleven or, depending on the outcome of the
federal district court's order granting sentencing relief in one case, possibly t w e l ~ e . ~
The Idaho Department of Correction reports that as of June, 2008, there were 7,817 Idaho
offenders serving prison sentences. See Idaho Department of Correction Standard Reports For

statslSta11dReportJuneO8~pdf).
June 2008 (viewable at:httu:/lwww.idoc.idaho.eov/facts/montl

"ee http:l/w.corr.state.id.us/faclsideath row.htin (Idaho Department of Corrections
website, last visited 6/4/09), There are seventeen death sentenced individuals in Idaho. Five of
those individuals stand to gain nothing hom Ring because each of their sentencing (or
resentencing) proceedings included or will include juries. They are Timothy Dunlap, Dale
Shacltelford, Darrell Payne, Erick Hall, and Azad Abdullah. The website iilcludes Richard
Leavitt as a death sentenced inmate when, in fact, the United States District Court granted him
sentencing relieE Leavitt v. Arave, USDC Case CV 93-0024-S-BLW (Judgment, Dkt.# 297,
9\28/07). In November, 2007, that court stayed its order and associated matters until the State's
appeal to the Ninth Circuit is complete. Thus, depending on the outcome of Mr. Leavitt's case, a
ruling that Ring applies retroactively will affect at most 12 Idaho prisoners.

Of these, four hundred eleven inmates were, as of June, 2008, incarcerated for murder and
manslaughter convictions. The eleven or twelve inmates who stand illegally sentenced to death
represent 0.14% or 0.15% of the total number of Idaho offenders serving prison sentences, and
2.6% or 2.9% of the total number of Idaho offenders incarcerated for murder and manslaughter.
This Court has previously allowed retroactive application where it would add a relatively
small number of cases to the district courts' dockets. See e.g., Bergman v. Heniy, 115 Idaho 259,
263,766 P. 2d 729,733 (1988) (retroactively applying a new rule finding that a cause of action
lies against a licensed vendor of intoxicating bevcrages for the wrongful death of and persolla1
injuries to third parties caused by the continued serving of alcohol to the patron of the bar). In
particular, acknowledging that the retroactive application at issue "may require the retrial of
some cases[,]" the Court noted that it was "confident that our efficient and hardworking trial
judges will be able to accommodate the relatively few cases that must be retried because of the
change in the law[.]" Baler, 117 Idaho at 698, 791 P.2d at 1277 (Idaho 1990).7 Based on the
Indeed, the system has already absorbed without disruption the resentencings of no less
than 14 persons originally sentenced to death whose sentences were reversed for a number of
statutory andlor constitutional errors and later sentenced to life. See e.g., State v. Osborne, 102
Idaho 405,631 P.2d 187 (1981); State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546,873 P.2d 800 (1993); State v.
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,774 P.2d 299 (1989); State v. [ B ~ a n Lanltford,
]
127 Idaho 608,
903 P.2d 1305 (1995); State v. [Mark] Lanword, 468 F.3d 578 (9'h Cir. 2006); State v. Hoffman,
236 F.3d 523 (9"' Cir. 2001); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 90 P.3d 298 (2004); State v. Ivey,
123 Idaho 74,844 P.2d 703 (1992); Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483 (9IhCir. 1992); Gibson v.
Auave, Nos. 98-99020 & 98-9902 1 (settled), Barrajas v. State, Amended Judgment and Order,
Case No. CR-92-64 (D.Ct. Payette Cty. 2/2/95); Paz v. Arave, Order Case No. 93-132, Dkt. #49
(D.Ct. Idaho 101311996); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); Fetterly v.
State, Order, Case No. 89-1106 (D.Ct. Idaho 61611999) (granting sentencing relief); Beam v.
Arave, 966 F.2d 1563, amended (9IhCir. 1992) (granting sentencing relief). Additionally,
resentencings were ordered in light of Ring by Idaho dishict courts in the cases of Jimmie V.
Thomas (Jerome County), Michael A. Jauhola (Ada County), and Dale Schackleford (Latah
County), and by this Court in State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729,52 P.3d 874, reh denied (Idaho
2002),and State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,90 P.3d 278 (2003).

very small number of cases at stake here, the administration of justice factor weighs strongly in
favor of retroactively applying Ring.
The Court also has the authority to prevent the need for resentencing proceedings in those
few cases by reducing the sentences to the maximum legal tenn. See, State v. Lindquist, 99
Idaho 766,589 P.2d 101 (1979) (when defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, he was
necessarily found guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder; accordingly,
despite the fact that defendant could not be sentenced under the unconstitutional death penalty
statute then in effect or under the unconstitutional preamendment version, it was appropriate to
remand the cause to district court for resentencing to any punishment permitted for conviction of
the lesser included offense of second-degree murder); State v. Creech, 99 Idaho 779, 589 P.2d
114 (1979) (remanded for resentencing consistent with State v. Lindquist); see also, State v.

Movris, 131 Idaho 263,267, 954 P.2d 681,685 (1998) (district court's Rule 35 motion denial
reversed, and appellant's senteilce modified to bring it within legal limits).
Finally, administration of justice analysis cannot be merely by the numbers. It must also
take into account the need to maintain the public's coiltiiluing respect for judicial decisions
through justice and equitable outcomes. The jury injects a democratic element into the law. This
element is vital to the effective administration of criminal justice, not only in safeguarding the
rights of the accused, but in encouraging popular acceptance of the law and the necessary general
acquiescence in their application. Green v. US., 356 U.S. 165,215-16 (1958) (Black, J.,
dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.) (citations, internal quotation marks, and
footnotes omitted). Far from maintaining the public's continuing respect for the judiciary,

treating similarly situated individuals dissimilarly based on fortuity creates a lack of trust -which
is, of course, precisely the reason why the Constitutioil and Bill of Rights guarantee jury trials.
The Whitnzan test mandates that Ring be applied retroactively to Mr. Fields
E.

THE FEDERAL COURTS' RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE O F TEAGUE
K LANE SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED BY THE STATE OF IDAHO.

The purpose of the bar in Teague does not speak to the concerns of this Court in
determining whether to apply Ring to Petitioners. First, as the United States Supreme Court has
recently explained, Teague was adopted to limit federal habeas corpus relief based on the need
for comity and respect for finality of state court convictions in our federalist system. "If
anything, considerations of comity inilitate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief
to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague. And while finality is, of course,
implicated in the context of state as well as federal habeas, finality of state convictioils is a state
interest, not a federal one. It is a matter that States are free to evaluate, and weigh the importance
of, when prisoners held in state custody are seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by
their lower cou~-ts."Danfo~tI?at 1041 (emphasis added).
Rather than adopting Teague, this Court should maintain its consistent independent
examination, reasoning, and insistence on charting Idaho's own legal pathways. As the Court has
explained in the context of coilstitutional doctrine:
We do not suggest, however, that if federal courts were to change
these rules we would likewise change ours, unless, of course, our
rules were now held to violate the federal constitution. . . Long
gone are the days when state courts will blindly apply United
States Supreine Court interpretation and methodology when in the
process of interpreting their own constitutions.

State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 11 n.6,696 P.2d 856, 862 31.6 (1985).% State v. Guzman, 122
Idaho 981,842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992), this Court refused to adopt the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule because to do so would constitute "an independent constitutional violation by
the court in addition to the violation at the time of the illegal search," and recognized that
"judicial integrity mandated the exclusionary rule." Id. at 992, 842 P.2d at 671. Similarly,
"judicial integrity" now mandates the retroactive application of the right to a jury fact-finding in
a capita1 sentencing. To do otlielwise would constitute "an independent constitutional violation
by this Cou~t,in addition to the violation at the time of the" unconstitutional capital sentencing.
Id.

For these same reasons, adopting Teagzke without first examining whether it is a sound
retroactivity doctrine for cases on collateral review would also risk the unexpected expenditure of
state resources.
Even when this Court accepted a similar search and seizure 'expectation of privacy" in
garbage as delineated by the federal courts, it noted that in the cases in which this Court has
found that the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection than the United States Constitution,
it has done so "on the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing
jurisprudence." State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,473,20 P.3d 5,8 (2001). Idaho's long-standing
jurisprudence on retroactive application of fundamental rights requires granting to Mr. Fields

'See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,988, 842 P.2d 660,667 (1992) (rejecting federal
good faith exception to exclusionary rule); State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462,467, 943 P.2d 52, 57
(1997) (adopting broader test for scope of curtilage than required by the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution):
,. State v. Thomason. 114 Idaho 746, 749. 760 P.2d 1162, 1165
(1988) (holding that Idaho Constitution requires more than Fourth hmeidment regarding pen
registers, i.e.- that a warrant based on probable cause must be obtained before law enforcement
may use a pen register)

what the vast majority of death row inmates have and will enjoy. Beyond that, the even longer
history in which juries were involved in the sentencing process in capital cases invites the
retention of its current retroactivity doctrine rather than the limitations Teague imposes. There is
nothing in Teague 's efforts, to limit the remedies available in federal habeas and promote comity
and finality, that undermines this Court's continued adherence to its established principles and
commitment to justice.
1.

The Right to a Jury Trial Is a Fundamental Right.

Just as the importance of the right to a jury trial speaks in favor of honoring that
constitutional right retroactively, it speaks against the reasonableiless of relying on Teague to bar
its application to Mr. Fields' death sentence. As noted in greater detail above and acknowledged
in Sunzmevli~z,the right to a jury trial is fundamental and thus, "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," implicating "fu~damentalfairness." Id., 542 U.S. at 358 ("the right to jury trial is
fundamental to our system of criminal procedure and States are bouiid to enforce the Sixth
hnei1dn1ent's guarantees as we interpret them"); see also, 542 U.S. at 359 (Breyer, J. dissenting)
("The majority does not deny that Ring meets the first criterion, that its holding is "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." ).
2.

The Teague Retroactivity Doctrine Violates Federal and State
Equal Protection and Due Process Guarantees on Their Faces
And as Applied.

Any retroactivity doctrine which denies the benefit of a new rule to some petitioners
while allowing it to others based on a foiluitous difference violates a guiding principle of state
and federal equal protection and due process guarantees: it fails to treat relevantly similar cases
similarly. Further, state action violates the fundamental fairness due process guarantee when it

"violates those 'fundan~entalconceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions,' Mooney v. I$olohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), and which define 'the community's
sense of fair play and decency,' Rochin v. California, [342 U.S. 165,] 173 [1952]." Dowling v.
Uncted States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990).
The United States Supreme Court has loilg held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial in serious criminal cases is a fundamental right the infriilgement of which violates the
fundamental fairness guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). "[Tlhe right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is a

fundamental right and hence must be recognized by the States as part of their obligation to
extend due process of law to all persons within their jurisdiction." Id. at 154. The Court recently
reaffiimed this, in a decisioil written by Justice Scalia, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury "is fundamental to our system of crimiilal procedure, and States are bound to enforce
the Sixth Amendment's guarantees as we interpret them." Sumnzerlin, 542 U.S. at 358.
The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states froin infringing
fundamental rights unless "'narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."' Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,302 (1993)).

Similarly, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from either
classifying people or applying laws such that only soine individuals may exercise a fundamental
right, unless the classification or application is narrowly tailored to serve some compelling state
interest. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450,458 (1988) (when law
interferes with a fundamental right, it triggers strict scrutiny review); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373 (1886) ("whatever. . . the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied. . .

with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal
protection of the laws which is secured . . . by the . . . [Flourteenth [A]mendme~lt[.]").
Applying Idaho's retroactivity test as described above or any other test in a way that
denies Mr. Fields the benefit of Ring because his conviction and sentence was final when Ring
was decided would violate his state and federal equal protection and due process rights. It would
violate those rights because it would deny his fundamental right to a jury trial without any
compelling state interest being served. The State has no interest, let alone a compelling one, to
see its citizens executed pursuant to a sentence which cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Denying full retroactivity to fundamental rights, regardless oftheir implications upon factfinding accuracy, violates due process and equal protection under black letter law. The United
States Supreme Court has not resolved whether a retroactivity doctrine which grants or denies
relief in a case depending on the fortuity of the date of the judgment's finality, as does Idaho's,
violates federal constitutional equal protection or due process guarantees. U.S. Const. amend.

XIV.
To deny the retroactive application of Ring in Idaho where a dozen individuals may be
executed having been deprived the right to a jury in the determination of their death-eligibility is
morally inexplicable and defies the principles of uniformity and equity.
Consider, for example, the cases of Messrs. Fetterly and Fields. First degree murder
prosecutio~lswere co~n~nenced
against Mr. Fetterly in 1983 and Mr. Fields in 1988. Based on

Ring, Mr. Fetterly's sentence was overturned in 2002. Yet the State charged Mr. Fetterly six
years before it charged Mr. Fields.

The reason Mr. Fetterly received the benefit of Ring was not based on anything other than
the chance event that the federal courts ordered that Fetterly be resentenced, and his direct appeal
from that resentencing was not final when Ring was decided. State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729,
730, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (2002).
If this Court adopts the Teague doctrine or any other retroactivity doctrine that bars
retroactive application based on fortuitous events, Mr. Fields, this Court, and Idaho will never
lcnow if a jury would have found him eligible for a death se~ltence.

A fact is beyond dispute: both Fields and Fetterly completed the direct appeal of their
conviction and sentence before Ring was decided. The difference between thein - that Fetterly
was granted resentencing proceedings while Mr. Fields has not - is fortuitous. That Mr. Fields
die due simply to the uncertain pace of litigation is undoubtedly not the intent of this Court and
certainly is not illustrative of this State's commitment to justice and fair play. Where two
prisoners are in every important respect identically situated, the ordinary citizen will not
understand only one receiving Ring relief. "[Tlhe ordinary citizen . . . will simply witness two
iildividuals, both sentenced through the use of unconstitutional procedures, one individual going
to his death, the other saved, all through an accident of timing." Summevlin at 364 (Breyer J.,
dissei~ting).See also, Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51,63 (1985) ("Under the majority's rule,
otherwise identically situated defendants inay be subject to different constitutioilal rules,
depending on just how long ago now-unconstitutional conduct occurred and how quickly cases
proceed through the criminal justice system.") (White, J, dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J, and
O'Connor, J).

Teague and other retroactivity doctrines which turn on fortuity are unsound for cases on

collateral review in state court. This Court should not employ a procedural bar based on
technical differences wholly unattributable to the petitioner. Where a life hangs in the balance,
as Mr. Fields' does here, it violates due process and equal protection guarantees to place a heavy
thurnb on the prosecution's side of the scales.
F.

IDAHO CODE §2719(5)(C)'S ANTI-RETROACTIVITY PROVISION HAS
NO APPLICATION HERE.

Petitioner aclcnowledges that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(c) provides that, "A successive
post-conviction pleading . . . shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks
retroactive application of new rules of law." Id. at 19-2719(5)(c). Given the extraordinary
circumstances presented here, Fields nevertlieless seeks postconviction relief through the
retroactive application of Ring, contending that Section 2719(5)(c) may not properly preclude
successive postconviction petitions in this case,
There are four reasons for this. First, Section 19-2719(5)(c) violates the Idaho
Constitution's separation of powers requirement. Second, Idaho law prohibits retroactively
applying Section 19-2719(5)(c) to these cases. Third, Section 19-2719(5)(c) violates state and
federal Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees. Fourth, that statutory provision's
application in the instant case would violate the United States Constitution's guarantee of a
republican f o m ~of state government
1.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(C) Violates the Idaho Constitution
Separation of Powers Requirement.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts,
which the Idaho Constitution provides is "original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in

equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." By limiting the district
court's jurisdiction, the statute runs afoul of the Idaho Constitution's mandate that the branches
of govemment maintain separation of powers. That mandate is found in two places in the Idaho
Constitution, Article 2, Section 1, and Article 5, Section 13.
It is settled that a Section 19-2719 proceeding "is a proceeding entirely new and
independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction." Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho
534, 536, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986). Article V, Section 13's mandate that the legislature
"provide a proper system of appeals" does not extend to Section 19-2719 proceedings because
they are not appeals.
As applied to Section 19-2719(5)(c), Article V, Section 13's reservation of legislative
power cannot be squared with its prohibition against the legislature's depriv[ing] "the judicial
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of
govemment." There are at least two reasons for this. First, this Court has long held that, "the
powers reserved to the several departments of the government, but not specifically enumerated in
the constitution, must be defined in the context of the common law. State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho
236, 240,486 P.2d 247, 251 (1971)." State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 792,919 P.2d 319,321
(1996). If the courts possessed the authority at comlnon law, then it "may not properly be
abrogated by statute." Id. At common law, new constitutional decisions were given full
retroactive effect. Thus, "[alt common law there was no authority for the proposition that
judicial decisions made law only for the future. Blaclcstone stated the rule that the duty of the
court was not to 'pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.' 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries 69 (1 5"' ed. 1809)" Linlclettev v. Walker, 381 U S . 618, 622-23 (1965) (footnote

omitted). Thus, because at common law the judiciary had authority to consider claims requiring
retroactive application of new rules of law and because Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c)
purports to remove from district courts their authority to hear such claims, that statutory
provision must be struck as offending Idaho Constitution Article V, Section 13.
This Court has consistently rejected past legislative efforts to restrict the judiciary's
jurisdiction. In State v. Interest of Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241,246, 300 P.2d 491,494 (1956), this
Court struck a statute purporting to transform previously criminal matters of juveniles into civil
matters because "[tlhe legislature, by denoting as a civil matter what the law has previously
regarded as a felony, attempt[ed] to take away jurisdiction vested in the district court by the
constitution itself, and . . . attempted to render that court powerless to do anything about the
prosecution of such persons." Similarly, in Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441,44445,243 P.2d 303,304 (1952), this Court held that "[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the
district court by the constitution, Art. 5, $20, cannot be diminished by the legislature. Const. Art.
5, §13[.]" Again, in Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251,256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (1951), the
Court held that "[tlhe broad jurisdiction [created by Arlicle 5, Section 131 is not subject to
diminution by legislative act." The Court held the same thing in Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho
122, 127,212 P.2d 1031, 1033-34 (1949). Finally, in McKnight v. Grant, 13 Idaho 629,637,92

P. 989,990 (1907), the Court held that, "We think [Article 5, Section13] was . . . intended to
preserve to tbe judicial department of the state govemnent the right and power to finally
determine controversies between parties involving their rights and upon whose claims some
decision or judgment must be rendered or determination made." In short, this Court has
consistently and long held that the legislature inay not directly or otherwise restrict the district

court's jurisdiction. Consequently, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) caimot stand as a bar to
granting Ring full retroactive application.
2.

Established Idaho Law Prohibits Retroactively Applying Idaho Code
Section 19-2719(5)(C).

The Idaho Code provides that, "No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared." I.C. $73-101. With regard to amendinei~tsto existing statutes, they "will
not, absent an express legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in
application. .Johnson v. Sloddard, 96 Idaho 230,526 P.2d 835 (1974)[.]" Nebelcer v. Piper
Aircrafl Corporation, 113 Idaho 609, 614,747 P.2d 18,23 (1987) (citations omitted). In 1995,

subsectioi~(5)(c) was amended into Idaho Code Section 19-2719. This ainendment was Section
3 of Chapter 140 (S.B. 1084) of the 1995 Idaho Session Laws. The Act containiilg the

anlendinent did not contain any express statement that the amendment or any other part of the
Act should be applied retroactively. Thus, Idaho Code Section 73-101 precludes Section 192719(5)(c)'s retroactive application to the instant case.
Though Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) expressly purports to absolutely bar
postconvictioil petitioners' claiins dependent on retroactively applying a new rule of law, it
contains no express legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot,
then, be applied to the case at bar.
3.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(C) Violates Petitioner's Rights to Due
Process and Equal Protection Guaranteed Under the United States
and Idaho Constitutions.

If Petitioners did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section19-2719(5)(c)'s
anti-retroactivity provision would not apply. The Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act

("UPCPA") govenls non-capital postconvictio~lproceedings. LC. 519-4901 et seg. The UPCPA
provides that '>post-conviction reliefis not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where
later case law suggests a conviction is unlawful." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,766 n.12,760
P.2d 1174, 1182 11.12 (1988) (citing I.C.5 19-4901) (emphasis added). The Act also provides
that a claim can only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. I.C. $194908; McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700-01,992 P.2d 144, 149-50 (1999). However, in
addition to the UPCPA, the statutory scheme governing capital postcoi~victioncases includes
Idaho Code Section 19-2719. This Court has held that, "LC. 5 19-2719 does not eliminate the
applicability of the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their
provisions conflict." McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700,992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999). Because
Section 19-2719(5)(c) would not preclude the application of Ring to Petitioners were they not
sentenced to death, that statutory provision violates Petitioners' due process and equal protection
rights.
Enforcing Section 19-2719(5)(c) against Petitioners would violate their rights to equal
protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Co~lstitutionbecause the disparate treatment of
capital and non-capital postconviction petitioners is not necessary to promote a compelling state
interest. Alternatively, it would violate their rights to equal protection and due process under the
same authorities because there is no rational basis for the disparate treatment. Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996) (amendment to Colorado Constitution that prohibited all legislative,

executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination
violated equal protection c l a ~ s e ) . ~
At issue is the disparity in the manner in which fundamental rights are enforced in Idaho
postconviction proceedings, depending on whether the actions are being prosecuted by capital or
non-capital petitioners. The fundamental rights at stake here are the right to fairness in the
criminal process and the right to fairness in procedures for enforcing claims concerning
governmental deprivations of life or liberty.'' Where fundamental rights are at stake, the

'See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-51 (1985) (Requiring
a special use permit for proposed group home for the mentally retarded violated equal protection
clause in that requirement, in absence of any rational basis in record for believing that group
home would pose any special threat to city's legitimate interests, appeared to rest on an irrational
prejudice against inentally retarded); Zobel v. Williains, 457 U.S. 55, 61-64 (1982) (holding that
"the Alaslca dividend distribution plan violates the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."); U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,535 (1973) (Provision of the
Food Stamp Act which excludes from participation any household containing an individual who
is unrelated to any other member of the household creates an irrational classificatioil in violation
of the equal protection conlponent of the due process clause of the FiRh Amendment); Sterling
H. Nelson &Sons, Inc. v. Bender, 95 Idaho 813,814-16, 520 P.2d 860, 861-63 (1974) (holding
that subsectio~lsetting out higher weight limits for haulers of unprocessed agricultural
commodities than haulers of processed agricultural coinmodities was unconstitutional as
discriminatory.)
'oDouglasv. California, 372 U.S. 353,356-58 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants
were denied equal protection of the law where merits of their one appeal they had as of right
from their convictions are decided without benefit of counsel); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189,
194-98 (1971) (Distinction drawn by Illinois Supreme Court Rule which provided trial
transcripts only in felony cases was 'unreasoned distinction' proscribed by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding "that the fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
19 (1956) (State must provide corrective rules to overcome denial to the poor of an adequate
appellate review granted to all who have inoney enough to pay the costs in advance. See Ronald
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law $15.7 (4th ed. 2007).

discriminatory scheme must be assessed with strict scrutiny." The stated purpose of the
offending statute, to eliminate purportedly unnecessary delay in canying out valid death
sentences, is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the violation of Petitioner's
fundamental rights by carrying out an undisputedly invalid death sentence. The disparity in
enforcement mecl~anisinsis not necessary to any compelling state interest.

4.

Applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) Would Violate The
Federal Constitution's Guarantee Of A Republican Form Of State
Government.

The United States Constitution guarantees that state government will be republican in
form. U.S. Const. Art. 4, 54. Petitioners concede that it is unclear whether the Guarantee Clause
accords federal courts authority to review the internal allocations of power within a state.

Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court,for the State of Massachusetts, 373 F.3d 219,227 (1" Cir.
2004) (comparing Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring, joined by
Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) (Guarantee Clause allows such review) with id. at 123-24 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) ("Nothing in Article I1...frees the state legislature
from the constraints in the State Constitution that created it."). Petitioners also concede that not
every state law separation of powers violation constitutes a Guarantee Clause violation.

"See Van Valkenburgh v. Citizensfor Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 126, 15 P.3d 1129,
1134 (2000) (if a fundamental right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law infringing
on that right is strict scrutiny); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 71 1,714,535 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1975)
(strict scrutiny when statute's classification infringes upon a fundamental right); State v. Breed,
111 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205 (Ct. App. 1986) (strict scrutiny of statutory schemes that
infringe upon a '"fundamental right' such as voting, procreation, or constitutional safeguards for
persons accused of crimes"). See generally, Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowalt, Treatise On
Coiistitutional Law § 18.41 at 800-01(3'd ed. 1999) ("When the govenunent taltes actions that
burden the rights of a classification of persons in terms of their treatment in a criminal justice
system it is proper to review these laws under the strict scrutiny standard for equal protection.").

However, Petitioners contend that some state law violations do violate the Guarantee Clause.
Specifically, where a state govenment provides no form of redress for an egregious state law
separation of powers violation, that state law violation constitutes a Guarantee Clause violation.
Where a separation of powers violatioil precludes sentencing relief in cases where lives hang in
the balance, as in Petitioners' cases before the Court, the violation is egregious and constitutes a
Guarantee Clause violation.
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Mr. Fields' death sentence should be vacated and the case should be
remanded to the district court for resentencing consistent with the principles announced in Ring
v. Arizona.
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